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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—One Small Step for Juveniles, One Giant Leap for
Juvenile Justice; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)
Leonardo P. Caselli*
Introduction
Precedent, science, and common sense all reflect the notion that juveniles are
less culpable than adults.1 The United States juvenile justice system, however, has
cast aside its original role of caring for those who cannot care for themselves.2 In
response to widespread fear and misperception of rising crime rates, juvenile justice
policy is now oriented toward protecting society from juvenile offenders.3 Juvenile
sentences have grown longer and harsher, with appellate courts reluctant to review
juvenile sentencing practices.4 All of this changed, however, in 2010 with Graham
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2012. I would like to thank my family for
raising me in a house full of love and books, the editorial board of the Wyoming Law Review for their
assistance, the faculty here at the University of Wyoming College of Law for always having an open
door, and of course Samm Lind for all of her patience and support.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (stating the diminished
culpability of minors disqualifies them from the worst class of offenders); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (noting a juvenile is less culpable than an adult who commits a comparable
crime); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (commenting that laws and precedent
reflect the reduced responsibility and maturity of minors); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953) (“Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect.”); Hawkins v. Hargett,
200 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the chronological age of a defendant relates to
his culpability); Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime
& Just. 81, 83 (2000) (observing that adolescents are less culpable due to their diminished capacity
for reasoning and moral judgment). See generally 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 886 (2010)
(referring to the Court’s decisions that juveniles have certain traits that render them less culpable as
a class).
1

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2050 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“States over
the past 20 years have consistently increased the severity of punishments for juvenile offenders.”);
Bishop, supra note 1, at 83–84 (discussing the gradual shift of juvenile justice policy away from
a parens patraie role to a more punitive orientation). After World War II, widespread fears about
increased juvenile crimes led to an increase in the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult courts. See
Daniel E. Traver, Comment, The Wrong Answer to a Serious Problem: A Story of School Shootings,
Politics and Automatic Transfer, 31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 281, 287–88 (2000) (discussing the history of
transfer post-WWII).
2

3
See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (2006)
(finding a widespread consensus of high juvenile crime rates despite an overall decrease in actual
crime rates); Ernestine S. Gray, The Media—Don’t Believe the Hype, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 45,
46–47 (2003) (noting that despite increased media coverage, violent juvenile crime has actually
been decreasing since 1994); Shannon F. McLatchey, Juvenile Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of
the Get-Tough Approach, 10 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 401, 406–07 (1999) (describing the recent
“get tough” shift in juvenile justice policy brought about by public fear, politicians, and the media).

See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1980) (describing how successful challenges
to the proportionality of a sentence are quite rare); Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater:
4
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v. Florida, when the United States Supreme Court prohibited life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders.5 The Graham decision offers such
offenders the possibility of redemption—through demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation they now have a meaningful chance of release.6
This case note advocates extending Graham’s holding to prohibit juvenile
life-without-parole (JLWOP) sentences altogether, due to the need for a more
humanitarian Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and a lack of
criminological justification for punitive juvenile justice.7 The background section
of this note outlines the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
and includes the history of juvenile justice in America.8 Next, this note takes
issue with Graham’s narrow scope, supported by a discussion of sentencing error
and constitutional theory.9 Finally, drawing support from international law and
empirical research, this note advocates for the return to a more humane, effective
system of juvenile justice.10

Background
Under the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”11 The
Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 659, 677 (2005)
(noting that from 1992–1997, a widespread increase in removal of juveniles to adult courts
allowed for the imposition of harsher punishments); Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and
Regularizing Punishment, 26 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 35–36 (2009) (describing how appellate courts have
generally upheld sentences for a term-of-years despite the constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment).
See 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Mark Hansen,
What’s the Matter with Kids Today, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 55 (2010) (quoting a statement that the Court
has clearly embraced a “kids are different” view). Graham is the first case to ingrain redemption
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, forbidding states from making the judgment that
any juvenile is truly irredeemable. See Robert Smith & Ben G. Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v.
Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 86,
92 (2010). Essentially, Graham offers juvenile life offenders the possibility of hope in spite of cruel
sentencing practices. Id. at 94.
5

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (explaining that a state must provide “defendants like
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation”).
6

See infra notes 104–71 and accompanying text (advocating for a bright-line rule against all
JLWOP sentences).
7

See infra notes 11–59 and accompanying text (discussing categorical restrictions against
cruel and unusual punishment, proportionality in sentencing, and principles of juvenile justice).
8

9
See infra notes 104–52 and accompanying text (criticizing the scope of Graham based on
concerns with sentencing error and the need for increased judicial activism).
10
See infra notes 153–71 and accompanying text (discussing international models of
juvenile justice).
11
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Court has construed “cruel and unusual punishments” to
include barbarities such as torture and punishments excessive to the crime committed. Bryan A.
Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 239 (2d ed. 1995).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss1/9

2

Caselli: Criminal Law - One Small Step for Juveniles, One Giant Leap for J

2011

Case Note

271

Framers of the United States Constitution intended the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to proscribe certain methods of punishment.12 But prior to
Graham the United States Supreme Court only issued three categorical restrictions
against cruel and unusual punishments.13 One such categorical restriction forbids
the use of capital punishment for non-homicide offenses against individuals.14 In
Atkins v. Virginia, the Court also prohibited the execution of mentally retarded
defendants.15 Most recently, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons the Eighth
Amendment forbids capital punishment for crimes committed as juveniles.16
The Court decided Roper and Atkins through its “evolving standards of decency”
analysis—in which the Court interprets the Eighth Amendment through
consideration of prevailing moral standards in today’s society.17

Proportionality in Sentencing
In contrast to a few bright-line rules restricting capital punishment, the
Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment to noncapital crimes is imprecise.18
Lower courts struggle with how and whether to apply the Eighth Amendment

12
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991) (describing floor debates at the
First Congress to show the original intent of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1976) (explaining how the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was directed at prohibiting torture and barbarous punishment).

See Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death Penalty:
Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury, 77 Fordham L.
Rev. 2955, 2982 (2009) (noting the Court has rarely adopted categorical exclusions to the death
penalty for certain classes of offenders). The Graham majority expressed its reluctance to impose an
additional categorical rule. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (“Categorical rules
tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary here.”).
13

See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits capital punishment for the rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797 (1982) (holding that capital punishment is impermissible against a robber who does not
commit or intend to commit homicide). The Kennedy Court concluded that non-homicide crimes
are fundamentally different than first-degree murder in the context of capital punishment. 128 S.
Ct. at 2660. Recently, the Court also concluded that capital punishment must be confined to the
most serious crimes. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
14

15

536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).

16

543 U.S. at 578.

See id. at 560–61 (noting that interpretation of the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of evolving standards of decency); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12 (observing that
proportionality review is guided by evolving standards of decency). In Trop v. Dulles, the Court first
used its “evolving standards of decency” analysis. See 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”).
17

18
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (describing the Court’s
struggles in applying the Eighth Amendment to noncapital crimes); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (acknowledging unclear and inconsistent precedent in the area of sentencing
proportionality); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L.
Rev. 677, 679–81 (2005) (describing sentencing proportionality review as “messy and complex”).
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to challenges of a term of years.19 In the late nineteenth century, the Court held
that punishments of torture and other unnecessarily cruel punishments are
forbidden.20 At that time, the Court refrained from clarifying the meaning of
unnecessary cruelty, aside from describing a few choice examples.21
In a series of cases beginning around the turn of the century, the Court
established its initial interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.22 In Weems v. United States, the Court held a sentence of hard labor
for twelve to twenty years was disproportionate to the crime of falsifying an
official document.23 Then, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court declared a sentence of
denationalization unconstitutionally severe, even for the crime of wartime
desertion.24 Taken together, Weems and Dulles stand for the proposition
that even a prisoner has the right to his dignity and humanity.25 In 1976, the
Court continued this line of reasoning in Estelle v. Gamble, holding the Eighth
Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners.26
The Gamble Court also stated the Eighth Amendment embodies principles of
humanity, decency, dignity, and civilized standards.27

See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
difficulty in determining whether a sentence of years is constitutionally disproportionate); John
D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism,
71 Ohio St. L.J. 71, 75 (2010) (“It has become conventional wisdom that Eighth Amendment
proportionality jurisprudence is a mess.”).
19

Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). “Cruel and unusual punishment” is a phrase
that brings to mind “the whipping post and the ducking stool.” Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of
Law 105 (Revised ed. 1969).
20

See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36 (noting the difficulty in determining an exact definition of
the Eighth Amendment). This case described several punishments as unconstitutionally torturous,
including: (1) being drawn and dragged to the place of execution; (2) being disemboweled alive,
quartered, and then beheaded; (3) being dissected in public; and (4) being burned alive for treason.
Id. at 135.
21

See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 111, 140 (2007) (describing how the Court began
applying the Eighth Amendment to criminal sentences in a series of decisions starting with Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
22

23
See 217 U.S. at 381. Weems also stands for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment
safeguards against unrestrained governmental power through sentencing. See id. (describing how an
unconstitutionally excessive sentence is the hallmark of an oppressive government).
24

356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958).

Nilsen, supra note 22, at 140; see Weems, 217 U.S. at 411 (White, J., dissenting) (noting
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to prohibit barbarous and inhumane
punishments); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.”).
25

26
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In Gamble, the Court also prohibited punishments which
constitute the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
27

Id. at 102–03.
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A few years later, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court began a pattern of
deference to legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.28 Rummel involved
the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence for a white-collar criminal
under Texas’s recidivist statute.29 The Court held such a sentence was not
unconstitutionally disproportionate, despite thefts amounting to a total of less
than $300.30 The next decision, Hutto v. Davis, involved a challenge to a fortyyear sentence imposed for possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana
with a street value of about $200.31 The Court upheld the sentence, noting that
“‘successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences’ should be
‘exceedingly rare.’”32
Next, in Solem v. Helm, the Court set forth its “gross disproportionality” test.33
Under this test, courts determine the constitutionality of a particular sentence by
looking at three factors: (1) “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty;” (2) “sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;” and
(3) “sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”34
In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court held that severe, mandatory penalties are not
unconstitutionally excessive.35 Most recently, in Ewing v. California, the Court

See 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (reasoning that recent categorical decisions involving capital
punishment and denationalization justify a reluctance to review a term of years alone). This case
was the first in which the Court noted deference to legislatures regarding the “line-drawing process”
in sentencing. Id. at 275, 284. Deference to the “line-drawing process” means that legislatures are
generally free to determine sentences for a term of years, free of judicial review by lower courts. See
Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures,
and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. Cal.
Interdisc. L.J. 217, 238 (2003) (describing how Rummel sent a signal to lower courts that generally
discouraged proportionality review).
28

29

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264–65.

30

Id. at 265–66, 285.

31

454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).

32

Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).

463 U.S. 277, 288–93 (1983) (recognizing the Eighth Amendment forbids punishments
that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, and setting forth a proportionality analysis). Prior to
the Graham ruling, Solem was the only case in which the Court found a prison term unconstitutionally
disproportionate. See id. at 297–303 (holding that the crime of “uttering a ‘no-account’ check” for
$100 was unconstitutionally disproportionate to a life without parole sentence, even for a defendant
with a significant criminal history); Nilsen, supra note 22, at 148 (noting that since Solem, the Court
has not reversed a non-capital sentence for gross disproportionality).
33

34

Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.

501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991) (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not
unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation’s
history.”). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and even suggested the Eighth Amendment contains
no guarantee of proportionality. Id. at 960, 966. The dissent criticized the majority for essentially
discarding the second and third factors of its gross disproportionality test. See id. at 1020 (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting the plurality’s abandonment of the proportionality test set forth in Solem).
35
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upheld the constitutionality of California’s “three strikes” law.36 This case involved
a life sentence for the theft of a few golf clubs, and the Court upheld the sentence,
continuing its recent position of deference towards legislative policy.37 All of
these cases signify a strong trend towards judicial restraint in appellate review of
noncapital sentences.38

Principles of Juvenile Justice
Juvenile justice in America began with a humanitarian, progressive outlook.39
The first case delineating the parens patraie role of the state was Ex parte Crouse.40
In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a state may intervene on
behalf of children as the common guardian of the community.41 Illinois established
the first juvenile court in 1899, and the rest of the country followed suit.42 The
juvenile courts differed from their adult counterparts in three important respects:
(1) the proceedings were separate from those for adult offenders; (2) parents were
involved in the proceedings; and (3) children were not imprisoned in adult jails.43

538 U.S. 11, 27–31 (2003). Well-publicized research in the early 1990s warned of an
upcoming wave of juvenile “super-predators.” Gray, supra note 3, at 46. This predicted crisis never
occurred but prompted a hyper-punitive scheme of crime control which led to the “three-strikes law”
challenged in Ewing. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing Youth, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
747, 753–54 (2001). California’s “three-strikes law” mandates an indeterminate life imprisonment
term for felony defendants who have two or more prior convictions for violent or serious felonies.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11.
36

37
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25. The Ewing Court stated that it does not function as a “superlegislature”
to second-guess policy choices of state legislatures. Id. at 28.

See Castiglione, supra note 19, at 77 (describing how the Court’s current model of
proportionality review seldom results in overturned sentences); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell,
Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 29 (2010) (“[O]nly one Supreme Court decision
and a handful of lower court decisions have ever invalidated an adult prison term as cruel and
unusual punishment.”); Nilsen, supra note 22, at 116 (describing how noncapital sentences are
inadequately scrutinized by appellate courts).
38

See Audrey Dupont, The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Age and the
Constitutionality of Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 78 Denv. U. L. Rev.
255, 257 (2000) (describing the progressive roots of the juvenile justice system). Progressive
reformers envisioned a system that protected and nurtured juveniles, rather than holding them
wholly accountable for their actions. Id.
39

See 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). Parens patraie means that the “state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves.” Clarke, supra note 4, at 403.
40

41

Crouse, 4 Whart. at 9–11.

Clarke, supra note 4, at 667. By 1925, juvenile courts existed in every state except for
Maine and Wyoming. Id. Maine and Wyoming established juvenile courts twenty years later. Jeffrey
M.Y. Hammer et al., Denying Child Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens: A Call to Return to the Roots
of Illinois’ Juvenile Court, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 925, 929 n.21 (2005).
42

43
See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 115–16 (1909) (describing
three key principles underlying juvenile-court legislation). This article also notes the revolution of
juvenile justice around the turn of the twentieth century. Id. at 104.
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America’s fledgling juvenile justice system soon became an example for the rest
of the world.44 It progressively emphasized rehabilitation and reintegration into
society—supported by principles of psychology and social science.45 Lawmakers
expected juvenile courts to determine the needs of a child rather than adopt a
punitive approach to juvenile justice.46 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to
shape juvenile justice law, as Congress had not set mandatory regulations for the
treatment of juvenile offenders.47 The Court first spoke on the nature of juvenile
justice in Kent v. United States, stating juvenile courts should provide guidance
and rehabilitation instead of punishing criminal conduct.48
A series of Supreme Court decisions clarified the rights of juveniles in criminal
proceedings.49 In Kent, the Court for the first time held a juvenile defendant
deserves at least the right to due process and fair proceedings.50 Then, In re Gault
enumerated the constitutional rights of juvenile defendants, including the right
to counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, timely notice of
charges, and the privilege against self-incrimination.51 Next, in In re Winship the

See Paolo G. Annino, Children in Florida Adult Prisons: A Call for a Moratorium, 28 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 471, 474 (2001) (“The creation of the juvenile justice system made the United States
the moral and legal model for the world.”).
44

See Clarke, supra note 4, at 667–69 (describing several goals of the Progressive Reformers
who were responsible for the creation of America’s juvenile justice system).
45

46

See id. (noting that early juvenile courts acted in the best interests of a child).

See Jelani Jefferson & John W. Head, In Whose “Best Interests?”—An International and
Comparative Assessment of US Rules on Sentencing of Juveniles, 1 Hum. Rts. & Globalization L.
Rev. 89, 126–27 (2007) (noting juvenile justice law is found in Supreme Court decisions because
there are no mandatory federal regulations regarding juvenile justice).
47

See 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (describing the objectives of juvenile court acts). Kent also
stands for the proposition that juvenile court acts are rooted in the social welfare philosophy. Id.
Thirty-four years earlier, the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama implied that young defendants
deserve at least a fair trial. See 287 U.S. 45, 57–69 (1932) (describing due process concerns when
a group of young, illiterate defendants were rushed into a capital trial without the benefit of
counsel beforehand).
48

See David W. Roush, Cognitive Behavioral Intervention with Serious and Violent Juvenile
Offenders: Some Historical Perspective, 72 Fed. Probation 30, 30 (2008) (describing a set of decisions
in the 1960s that resulted in changes known as the “constitutionalization” of the juvenile justice
system). The 1960s and early 1970s have also been described as a “due process revolution” with
respect to juvenile justice. Clarke, supra note 4, at 669–70.
49

See 383 U.S. at 562 (noting that a waiver hearing must at least satisfy the Due Process
Clause). Justice Abe Fortas, who wrote for the Court in Kent, was an avid supporter of children’s
rights. Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 261 (2005). As a young
Washington lawyer, Abe Fortas argued for indigent defendants’ right to counsel in front of the
Supreme Court and won. See Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas III, Criminal Procedure
Principles, Policies and Perspectives 954–55 (4th ed. 2010) (describing Abe Fortas’ litigation of
the seminal case Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963)).
50

387 U.S. 1, 32–57 (1967). In this case, the Court also stated that juveniles need the
“guiding hand of counsel” at every stage of proceedings against them. Id. at 36.
51
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Court held the government must prove any charges beyond a reasonable doubt
in juvenile courts.52 Finally, over thirty years later, the Court prohibited the
execution of juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.53
During the past few decades, the American juvenile justice system has
undergone a marked transition.54 Beginning in the late 1980s, a “get tough on
crime” movement gained momentum due to sharp increases in violent crimes,
especially among young minorities.55 Between 1992 and 1997, forty-four states
changed their laws to facilitate the transfer of juveniles to adult courts.56 A series
of school shootings—including the Columbine massacre—stunned the country
and fueled a wave of legislation intended to crack down on school violence.57 The
media’s focus on violent crime fueled public fear and frustration, and campaign
promises from politicians resulted in tougher laws and harsher sentences.58 As
a result of this transition, the United States juvenile justice system has shifted
from its parens patriae role to a more punitive role of protecting society from
juvenile offenders.59
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Winship also stands for the proposition that juvenile defendants
are entitled to criminal due process safeguards. See id. at 365–66 (“Civil labels and good intentions
do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts.”).
52

543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of
juvenile offenders). Roper extended the reach of Thompson v. Oklahoma, which struck down capital
punishment for juveniles younger than sixteen at the time of their offense. See Roper, 543 U.S. at
574 (“The logic of Thompson extends to those who are under 18.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting the execution of offenders who were younger than sixteen at the
time of their offense).
53

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010) (describing how multiple states have
moved away from their juvenile court systems).
54

Bishop, supra note 1, at 84. At this time, the media and even some academics portrayed
juvenile offenders as “vicious and savvy.” Id.
55

56
Id. In the late 1990s, nearly every state changed their transfer laws in order to bring more
juveniles into adult courts. McLatchey, supra note 3, at 407. Additionally, the rate of judicial
waiver—which allows judges to send juveniles into adult courts—increased at an astounding rate
of sixty-eight percent between 1988 and 1992. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing
Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 983, 992 (2008).
57
See Traver, supra note 2, at 281–83 (describing the effect of a recent string of school
shootings). Some academics have described the media’s focus on school shootings as disproportionate
to the actual occurrence of school violence. See Gray, supra note 3, at 49–50 (noting that only
0.16% of murders in the United States happen at schools, in contrast to the media’s portrayal of
school violence as widespread and endemic).

See McLatchey, supra note 3, at 406 (describing how the media, politicians, and public
attitudes have influenced juvenile justice policy).
58

See Bishop, supra note 1, at 85 (noting a recent and substantial expansion in the number
of juveniles transferred to adult courts); Clarke, supra note 4, at 674 (noting that lawmakers have
put aside rehabilitative goals in favor of a more punitive model of juvenile justice); Barry C. Feld, A
Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 189, 217
(2007) (describing how a retributive shift in juvenile justice policy signifies a major departure from
traditional goals of juvenile courts); McLatchey, supra note 3, at 406–07 (discussing how juvenile
59
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Principal Case
Terrance Graham, the petitioner, was born in 1987 to parents who suffered
from a crack cocaine addiction.60 He was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and began drinking and using drugs at an early
age.61 In 2003, at the age of sixteen, Graham and two accomplices attempted to
rob a restaurant, and one of his accomplices struck the restaurant manager in
the head with a metal pipe.62 The State of Florida filed charges against Graham,
including armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery.63
He pleaded guilty to the charges, and the trial court sentenced Graham to two
concurrent three-year terms of probation.64
In December 2004, police arrested Graham for two additional robberies.65
Police apprehended Graham after he fled the scene of a crime and found three
handguns in his car during the subsequent arrest.66 The State charged Graham
with violation of probation, armed burglary, and armed home invasion robbery.67
Graham’s attorney requested the minimum sentence of five years, and the State
asked for a forty-five year sentence, despite a presentence report’s recommendation
of four years.68 The trial judge sentenced Graham to life imprisonment for armed
burglary—the maximum sentence authorized by law.69
Due to Florida abolishing its parole system, Graham had no possibility of
release.70 Graham challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment, but the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed.71 The court concluded Graham
justice policy has shifted towards a more punitive outlook). But there is a recent push towards
juvenile justice reform in certain states and at a national level. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(10) (2006) (recommending the implementation of programs
that emphasize rehabilitation and effectively reintegrate juvenile offenders into the community); de
la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 1022–25 (describing the holistic and rehabilitative approach
of several juvenile justice programs).
60

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).

61

Id.

Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
2011 (2010).
62

63

Id.

64

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.

65

Id. at 2018–19.

66

Id.

67

Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d at 45.

68

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.

69

Id. at 2020.

Id.; see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003) (stating parole provisions do not apply to persons
sentenced under the Florida Criminal Punishment Code). Graham’s chances of being pardoned
were extremely rare. See United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting the rareness of executive clemency).
70

71

Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d at 44–45, 51.
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was incapable of rehabilitation and the sentence was not grossly disproportionate
to his crimes.72 Following a denial of review by the Florida Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.73 In a five to four decision, the
Graham court struck down juvenile life-without-parole (JLWOP) sentences for
non-homicide offenders.74

Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.75 The Court first explained the
typical approach for determining if an individual sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.76 Next the majority detailed
steps in determining a categorical restriction against certain types of cruel and
unusual punishment.77 As a starting point, the Court looked for any objective
evidence of a national consensus against JLWOP sentences.78 The Court examined
actual sentencing practices and found that JLWOP sentences are rare.79 Also,
the majority noted that transfer laws may contravene legislative intent to allow
JLWOP sentences and no other country in the world allows their imposition.80
Next, the Court considered the culpability of juvenile offenders along with
the severity of JLWOP sentences.81 It described JLWOP sentences as especially
severe—second only to the death penalty.82 Furthermore, it noted a juvenile
non-homicide offender is far less blameworthy than an adult murderer, but
the adult murderer may receive a lesser sentence in some cases.83 The Court
72

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.

73

Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (mem.).

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017, 2027, 2034. After the Court’s ruling in Graham, Florida
Attorney General Bill McCollum stated that Terrance Graham would probably be resentenced to a
“very long” prison term. See Hansen, supra note 5, at 55.
74

75

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017.

Id. at 2021 (noting the Eighth Amendment “‘forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the crime’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991))).
76

77

See id. at 2022–23.

78

Id. at 2023.

See id. (noting that although thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government allowed this sentencing practice, this alone was not dispositive). Only twelve
jurisdictions actually impose life sentences without parole against juvenile non-homicide offenders,
although thirty-eight jurisdictions are actually authorized to do so. Id. at 2023–24. Among these
jurisdictions, Florida is responsible for a significant majority of JLWOP offenders. Id. at 2024.
79

See id. at 2025, 2034 (describing how transfer laws make especially harsh sentences possible,
but stating legislatures may not have originally intended such harsh sentences).
80

81

Id. at 2026.

Id. at 2026–27. A life sentence without parole is especially final and pronounced for a
juvenile, who will serve more years than most adult offenders. Id. at 2028.
82

See id. at 2027 (noting that in comparison to an adult murderer, a juvenile non-homicide
offender has a twice diminished culpability).
83
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then considered penological justifications for JLWOP sentences, including
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.84 JLWOP sentences
thwart the goal of rehabilitation, as juvenile lifers will have no meaningful hope
of release and lessened access to rehabilitative programs.85 Additionally, the
goal of incapacitation is unjustified as it is nearly impossible to find completely
corrupted juveniles.86
Finally, the Court established a categorical restriction against JLWOP
sentences for non-homicide offenders, because anything short of a categorical rule
would fail to prevent the imposition of arbitrary, unconstitutional sentences.87 The
majority found the subjective imposition of JLWOP sentences exposes juveniles to
an unacceptable risk of sentencing error.88 Forbidding the imposition of JLWOP
sentences would give juvenile offenders a second chance—the opportunity to
mature, reflect, and eventually become a contributing member of society.89

Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment but ultimately rejected a
categorical restriction against JLWOP sentences.90 Relying on Graham’s youthful
propensities and diminished culpability, Roberts concluded that the individual
sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate.91 The concurrence argued
for a case-by-case approach, emphasizing a need for JLWOP sentences against
especially heinous non-homicide offenders.92 Roberts also acknowledged the
lessened culpability of juvenile offenders but declined to adopt a broad categorical
restriction against JLWOP sentences.93 According to Roberts those decisions
84

See id. at 2028 (describing the relevance of penological justifications).

85

See id. at 2030 (“The penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”).

See id. at 2026 (commenting on the difficulty that even expert psychologists face in
discerning incorrigible juveniles from others).
86

87
See id. at 2030–32 (describing the insufficiency of proposed alternatives, such as state laws
allowing for prosecutorial discretion in whether to charge juveniles as adults).
88
See id. at 2032–33 (noting that juveniles face a risk of sentencing error influenced by
the brutality of a crime). A categorical restriction also avoids the risk of grossly disproportionate
punishment because many juveniles mistrust adults and have trouble obtaining effective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 2032.
89
See id. at 2033 (“The State has denied [Graham] any chance to later demonstrate that he is
fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in
the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.”).

See id. at 2038–40 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (doubting the necessity of a categorical
restriction against JLWOP sentences).
90

91

Id.

See id. at 2041 (noting an example of a juvenile offender who beat and raped his victim
before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock).
92

See id. at 2037–40 (describing precedent that acknowledges the lessened culpability of
juveniles and proportionality review of non-capital sentences).
93
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should be left for trial judges at sentencing, deferring to their judgment as
to proportionality.94

Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas dissented, with Justices Scalia and Alito joining.95 The dissent
first contended the Court should defer to the moral judgments of the legislatures,
judges, and juries in the thirty-nine jurisdictions permitting the sentencing
practice at issue.96 Justice Thomas continued with an originalist argument—the
Framers did not intend to incorporate proportionality in sentencing into the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.97 Next, the dissent asserted that moral
judgments about who deserves a particular type of punishment should be at the
sound discretion of prosecutors, legislatures, judges, and juries.98 Finally, Justice
Thomas questioned the overall wisdom of a categorical restriction against a noncapital sentence.99

Analysis
JLWOP sentences present a special risk of sentencing error due to several
concerns: (1) the ineffective representation of many juvenile defendants; (2) the
arbitrary and inconsistent sentences imposed by trial judges; and (3) the fact that
most juveniles age out of any criminal tendencies.100 Appellate courts should
closely scrutinize these harsh sentences, rather than using the kind of narrow,
majoritarian analysis seen in Graham.101 Federal courts should also consider
international norms in their interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, especially
when every other nation rejects the sentencing practice at issue.102 For the
foregoing reasons, the United States Supreme Court should implement a brightline rule against JLWOP sentences under any circumstances.103

94
See id. at 2042 (reasoning that America’s justice system is premised on the concept that trial
judges are competent to weigh the gravity of an offense at sentencing).
95

Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

96

Id.

See id. at 2044–45 (using a penal statute adopted by the First Congress to demonstrate that
“proportionality in sentencing was not considered a constitutional command”).
97

98

See id. at 2045–46.

99

See id. at 2046 (“‘Death is different’ no longer.”).

See infra notes 104–26 and accompanying text (describing several sources of sentencing
error with JLWOP sentences).
100

See infra notes 127–52 and accompanying text (describing the need for increased judicial
restraint of problematic sentencing practices).
101

See infra notes 153–71 and accompanying text (discussing the binding effect of international
norms, especially the worldwide consensus against JLWOP sentences).
102

See infra notes 104–71 (discussing the need for a bright-line rule against JLWOP sentences).
See generally de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 987 (describing how JLWOP sentences are
inhumane and lack any penological justification).
103
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Sentencing Error
Based on the difficulty courts encounter in determining whether any juvenile
is truly incorrigible, the Supreme Court should impose a categorical restriction
against all JLWOP sentences.104 In Graham, the trial court handed down a JLWOP
sentence for a probation violation, despite the more lenient recommendations
of the prosecutor and corrections officials.105 This evidences the ad-hoc nature
of JLWOP sentencing by state courts—justifying the need for a categorical
restriction.106 Graham was a step in the right direction, but the Court should have
gone one step further and prohibited JLWOP sentences for all juveniles, including
homicide offenders.107 The Graham Court did not discuss this possibility, despite
a number of amicus curaie briefs advocating for a bright-line rule prohibiting all
JLWOP sentences.108
Successful challenges to a term of years based on sentencing error are rare.109
Nevertheless, certain punishments such as JLWOP sentences bear an unacceptable
104
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004) (stating that the Framers were “loath
to leave too much discretion in judicial hands”); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374,
378 (Ky. 1968) (“We believe that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth; that it is impossible to
make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for
the rest of his life.”); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (discussing the difficulty
in determining whether a juvenile defendant is beyond hope). In Naovarath, a seventh-grader
faced a JLWOP sentence after killing a man who had sexually molested him. 779 P.2d. at 944–45.
The Nevada Supreme Court overturned the sentence, holding the Constitution prohibited such a
sentence for a mentally and emotionally disordered thirteen-year-old child. Id. at 948–49 n.6.
105
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2019–21 (2010) (describing Graham’s
sentencing hearing).
106
Compare Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
2011 (2010) (holding that JLWOP sentences are not per se unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment), and Blackshear v. State, 771 So. 2d 1199, 1200–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a JLWOP sentence for a probation violation was not cruel and unusual punishment),
with Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 377–78 (holding that JLWOP sentences shock the conscience and
are an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment), and Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 948–49
(holding that a JLWOP sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment for a
mentally disturbed child).

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (admitting that juvenile sentencing
hearings are prone to error); Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 378 (noting that JLWOP sentences shock
the conscience and defy principles of fundamental fairness). But see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.
Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (describing how homicide offenses are more severe and irrevocable than
non-homicide offenses).
107

See Hansen, supra note 5, at 52–53 (describing several prominent organizations that filed
amicus briefs in support of the petitioner, including the American Bar Association (ABA) and
Amnesty International). The ABA argued that allowing JLWOP sentences would be inconsistent
with the Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons. Id. at 53; see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005) (holding that capital punishment is impermissible against juvenile offenders).
108

109
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (noting that reviewing courts should
substantially defer to the discretion of trial judges at sentencing); United States v. Millan-Torres,
139 F. App’x 105, 111 (10th Cir. 2005) (observing that sentencing error only meets the fourth
prong of plain error in rare cases).
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risk of sentencing error.110 Capital punishment also raises similar concerns about
sentencing error.111 As the Graham Court noted, “life without parole is ‘the
second most severe penalty permitted by law,’” sharing characteristics with capital
punishment.112 But JLWOP sentences lack the “super due process” requirement of
capital punishment.113 In fact, empirical analysis indicates that judicial waiver—
which transfers juvenile offenders into adult courts—occurs in an arbitrary,
inconsistent, and discriminatory manner.114 Our justice system also incarcerates
juvenile minorities in overwhelming numbers, indicating an unacceptable risk of
sentencing error in juvenile proceedings.115

110
See Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical
Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 207, 253 (2003) (arguing for
judicial action with punishments that present a high risk of sentencing error due to procedural
concerns and the concept of fundamental fairness).

See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 536 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that Idaho’s death penalty
statute requires mandatory review of the entire record for sentencing error); Leona D. Jochnowitz,
Missed or Foregone Mitigation: Analyzing Claimed Error in Missouri Capital Clemency Cases, 46 Crim.
Law Bull. 347, 347 (2010) (“The high prevalence of sentencing error claims shows that structural
overhaul of the capital trial may be needed.”). In 2000, former Illinois Governor George Ryan
imposed a moratorium on capital punishment due to concerns about sentencing error. Kandis
Scott, Why Did China Reform its Death Penalty?, 19 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 63, 73–74 (2010).
111

112
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). Life-without-parole sentences are similar to capital punishment in many
ways, including their finality, irrevocability, and the defendant’s utter lack of hope. Id.; see also
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (describing the severity and irrevocability of
capital punishment).
113
See United States v. Sauer, 15 M.J. 113, 118 (C.A.A.F. 1983) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(describing how “super due-process” is required by the Eighth Amendment in capital trials); Dressler
& Thomas, supra note 50, at 1011 (noting that capital cases require an additional sentencing phase);
Corrinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 365, 414
n.273 (2009) (noting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause mandates “super due process”
with respect to capital punishment).
114
Clarke, supra note 4, at 716. Some jurists have construed due process as a static, unyielding
check on arbitrary or unfounded decisions of trial judges. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 67 (2004) (describing the Constitution as a restraint on improper judicial discretion); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“Thus due process, according to
my Brother Harlan, is to be a phrase with no permanent meaning, but one which is found to shift
from time to time in accordance with judges’ predilections and understandings of what is best for
the country.”).
115
See Bishop, supra note 1, at 85–86 (concluding that minority youths are incarcerated in
overwhelmingly disproportionate numbers—a trend likely to continue). Nearly every state has
minority overrepresentation for incarcerated juveniles. De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at
993–96. For example, in the state of Wyoming, African-American youths are detained at a rate
of twelve to one when compared with whites. Id. at 995. This disproportionate sentencing of
minorities reflects on how schools and our culture as a whole are handling diversity. Your Neighbor’s
Child (Wyoming PBS television broadcast Oct. 7, 2010).
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Juvenile offenders face a heightened risk of sentencing error because of
difficulties in obtaining effective assistance of counsel.116 Recent cases clearly
establish that juveniles deserve the effective assistance of counsel during a trial or
adjudication of their guilt.117 Juveniles, however, are often incapable of mature
reasoning and have trouble navigating our justice system.118 Attorneys and
their juvenile clients often come from vastly different backgrounds, which may
jeopardize the attorney-client relationship.119 These issues undermine confidence
in the verdicts of juvenile proceedings and justify the need for a categorical
restriction against all JLWOP sentences.120
Perhaps the biggest risk of sentencing error derives from the fact that most
juveniles will age out of crime.121 The part of the brain regulating emotion,
judgment, and impulse control does not fully develop until a person’s early
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (noting several factors that can impair the fair and effective
representation of juveniles). In addition to juveniles, mentally retarded defendants often have
trouble understanding criminal proceedings, which can lead to an unfair trial. See Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002) (noting the impairments of mentally incapacitated defendants can
“jeopardize the reliability and fairness” of capital proceedings against them).
116

117
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that juveniles have the right to counsel at
every stage of criminal proceedings); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1932) (describing
due process concerns when a group of juvenile defendants did not have the aid of counsel until
trial). The right to counsel means the “right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)) (emphasis added).
118
Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15
Crim. Just. 26, 27 (2000). It is especially concerning that many juvenile offenders waive their right
to counsel without understanding what they are doing. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963) (“[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”); Your Neighbor’s Child,
supra note 115 (describing juvenile defendants’ limited understanding of criminal proceedings
against them, including an inadvertent waiver of the right to counsel in many cases).
119
See Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections on
Lawyering for Children, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 573, 608–11 (2008) (describing several
disparities between children’s attorneys and their clients). Juveniles also tend to mistrust adults,
even their own lawyer. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7–12, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)
(describing the adverse effect of adolescents’ mistrust of adults upon attorney-client relationships).
120
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (noting how a case-by-case approach does not account
for difficulties encountered by juveniles’ attorneys); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (describing difficulties in assessing ineffective assistance of counsel after a conviction);
Dressler & Thomas, supra note 50, at 886 (noting how the right to effective assistance of counsel
is violated when counsel’s performance undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial); Your
Neighbor’s Child, supra note 115 (explaining how juveniles can be pressured by counsel into pleading
out without fully understanding the consequences of a felony conviction).

See Benjamin L. Felcher, Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age
Should Be a Factor in Sentencing for First Degree Murder, 18 Law & Ineq. 323, 346 (2000) (noting
extensive empirical research finding most juvenile offenders will “age out” of their criminality).
Criminal activity by juveniles is typically the product of their antisocial tendencies, rather than
the hallmark of young career criminals. See Clarke, supra note 4, at 713 (noting the problems with
sentencing most adolescents as though they are career criminals).
121
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twenties.122 Recent research also suggests juvenile delinquency is strongly correlated
with adolescence and will dissipate with maturity.123 Even experts cannot readily
discern a lifelong juvenile offender from one whose crimes reflect a fleeting pattern
of immaturity.124 Juvenile offenders have “enormous potential” to turn their lives
around, and they deserve a second chance.125 Consequently, JLWOP sentences
are unconstitutionally cruel to those capable of rehabilitation, and thus the Court
should establish a bright-line rule against JLWOP sentences.126

Clarke, supra note 4, at 710. Neuroscience has debunked the idea that a child’s brain is
fully developed by puberty—adolescents in particular have decreased frontal lobe function. Id. at
708–09. It follows that adolescence could relate to a defendant’s culpability. See Hawkins v. Hargett,
200 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating the chronological age of a defendant relates to
their culpability).
122

123
Clarke, supra note 4, at 687, 708–11 (describing how adolescence relates to culpability).
Since their frontal lobes are not fully developed, juveniles tend to engage in risky behavior and
make impulsive, short-sighted decisions. See Johanna Cooper Jennings, Juvenile Justice, Sullivan,
and Graham: How the Supreme Court’s Decision will Change the Neuroscience Debate, 2010 Duke
L. & Tech. Rev. 6, 7 (2010) (describing how decreased frontal lobe function in juveniles affects
their decision-making abilities). Adolescents in particular have a limited capacity for long-term
reasoning, which negates the likelihood of deterrence. Bishop, supra note 1, at 82.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). Psychologists currently lack the diagnostic
tools to distinguish “life-course-persistent” offenders from other adolescents. Clarke, supra note 4,
at 724–25. Several former juvenile offenders filed an amicus brief in support of Terrance Graham,
including a Broadway actor, two acclaimed authors, an Assistant United States Attorney, a software
executive, and former Wyoming Senator Alan B. Simpson. Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders
Charles S. Dutton et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–3, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621). These former offenders described how they were able to turn their lives
around after troubled backgrounds, most notably Senator Simpson who was given a second chance
after assaulting a police officer. Id. at 7–32.
124

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We learn, sometimes, from
our mistakes.”); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 983 (concluding that a JLWOP sentence
“contradicts our modern understanding that children have enormous potential for growth and
maturity as they move from youth to adulthood, and the widely held belief in the possibility of
a child’s rehabilitation and redemption”). Adolescent crime is often the product of developmental
immaturity and tends to decline with age. See Clarke, supra note 4, at 711 (concluding that
adolescent participation in crime results from developmental influences on decision-making and
abates with maturity).
125

126
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that criminal proceedings must be “fundamentally fair in all respects”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (affirming that the Eighth Amendment forbids torture and “all other
punishments in the same line of unnecessary cruelty”); Your Neighbor’s Child, supra note 115
(statement of former United States Senator Alan Simpson) (“Deal with [juvenile offenders] as
fellow human beings, and you’ll make some real progress.”). Despair and hopelessness are the
hallmark of JLWOP offenders, as they have no meaningful chance of rehabilitation or release. See
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (majority opinion) (describing how rehabilitative services are largely
unavailable to those serving life terms); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (stating
that hopelessness is the hallmark of a JLWOP sentence); Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive
Clemency, Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women’s Capital Cases, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
967, 988 (2001) (“[G]rants of clemency have become . . . rare.”).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss1/9

16

Caselli: Criminal Law - One Small Step for Juveniles, One Giant Leap for J

2011

Case Note

285

Fixing a Broken System of Punitive Policy
Graham establishes the first categorical rule barring a non-capital sentence,
and it is only the second successful challenge to a prison term in history.127 This
represents a step in the right direction, but the Graham Court should have gone
further and prohibited JLWOP sentences altogether.128 Our hyper-punitive
scheme of juvenile justice is fundamentally unsound, and legislatures are unlikely
to address this problem.129 Instead of deferring to legislative judgments, the Court
should take a more active role to ameliorate problematic sentencing practices.130
The Supreme Court is unquestionably empowered to depart from the rigid
doctrines of history and stare decisis.131 Strict deference to past decisions is
127
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Graham represents
the first categorical restriction against a non-capital sentence in history); Fisher, supra note 4, at
36 (stating the Court has found a prison term to be unconstitutionally disproportionate only
once in its history). The Drafters attempted to enact a categorical restriction against torture, but
unfortunately they did not define the contours of that category. Adam Lamparello, Incorporating the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Framework into Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence Through
the Introduction of a Contingent-Based and Legislatively-Driven Constitutional Theory, 88 Neb. L.
Rev. 692, 731–32 (2010).

See Nilsen, supra note 22, at 119 (stating that life-without-parole sentences are especially
inhumane and degrading for children); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 986–87 (describing
how JLWOP sentences are inhumane, inappropriate, and lack any deterrent effect). In fact, many
JLWOP offenders have been physically and sexually abused as children, highlighting the inherent
cruelty of such a sentence. De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 984–85.
128

129
See Beres & Griffith, supra note 36, at 765 (concluding that the widespread demonization
of youth prevents the implementation of cost-effective, nonpunitive measures to reduce crime);
Clarke, supra note 4, at 661 (describing how public concern with violent juveniles has led to an
increasingly punitive scheme of legislation and juvenile justice policy); Gray, supra note 3, at 45, 56
(describing how excessive media coverage of juvenile crime leads to widespread fear that influences
public policy); Jefferson & Head, supra note 47, at 89–90 (arguing that the United States juvenile
justice system is questionable as it fails to comply with four key standards enumerated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child); Vanessa L. Kolbe, A Proposed Bar to Transferring
Juveniles with Mental Disorders to Criminal Court: Let the Punishment Fit the Culpability, 14 Va. J.
Soc. Pol’y & L. 418, 424 (2007) (observing that punitive legislative reform of the juvenile justice
system is still ongoing). Mandatory minimums have also come under fire in recent years. See Luna
& Cassell, supra note 38, at 1–4 (noting how various Presidents, lawmakers, and Supreme Court
Justices have questioned the wisdom of mandatory minimums).

See Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 947 (quoting unpublished draft opinion, Box 171, Harold
Hitz Burton Papers, Library of Congress) (“More than any other provision in the Constitution the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment depends largely, if not entirely, upon the humanitarian
instincts of the judiciary.”); Lee, supra note 18, at 682–83 (criticizing judicial conservatism in the
area of sentencing review, as the Eighth Amendment was intended as a “side constraint” on excessive
punishment); Nilsen, supra note 22, at 140 (noting how the Court initially viewed the Eighth
Amendment as a “moral bulwark to guide future generations”). In fact, one of the core purposes
of the Bill of Rights was to prevent arbitrary and oppressive criminal prosecutions. See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 116 (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing a history of governmental
oppression through the criminal process, which ultimately produced the Bill of Rights).
130

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (stating that historical premises, although
persuasive, are not the ending point of the Court’s analysis); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
131
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unnecessary when previous rationale no longer withstands careful analysis.132 This
is particularly applicable to JLWOP sentences, because the chances of corrective
legislation are extremely remote.133 The substantial expansion in transfers of
juveniles to adult courts is especially problematic, as these transfer laws tend to
reflect widespread fear rather than sound criminological theory.134 This expansion
of juvenile transfers has no jurisprudential basis, places an undue burden on the
justice system, and undercuts the legitimacy of criminal courts.135
Indeed, recent juvenile justice policy results from a flaw in the political
process.136 Due to the media’s focus on violent juveniles, politicians have come
under intense political pressure to crack down on juvenile crime.137 In turn,
politicians rely on a “get tough on crime” stance in order to get elected.138 This
(1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”). Supreme Court decisions that overrule a
previous constitutional command are not uncommon. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 (noting that the
Court has overruled thirty-three constitutional decisions in the past twenty terms).
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722–23 (2009). Stare decisis also holds less force with
respect to constitutional questions. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). However,
some jurists would argue that stare decisis should play a bigger role in constitutional interpretation.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing stare
decisis as the “preferred course,” even with constitutional interpretation).
132

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010) (suggesting that transfer laws may not
reflect legislative intent to allow JLWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses); Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting how precedent
holds less weight when “correction through legislative action is practically impossible”); Feld, supra
note 59, at 190 (describing how politicians have pushed through “get tough” legislation in order to
gain electoral advantage); McLatchey, supra note 3, at 406 (“Society has called for accountability
from even the youngest violent youths, and most states have responded.”).
133

See Clarke, supra note 4, at 687–88 (describing how the “increasingly punitive approach”
of the juvenile justice system has been brought about by public fear, hysteria, and misperception
rather than sound criminological theory). The transfer of juveniles to adult courts is especially
questionable, as it tends to actually increase recidivism. See id. at 680 (describing several issues
with transfer laws). The imprisonment of juvenile offenders exposes them to criminal minds
and ultimately results in recidivism. See Your Neighbor’s Child, supra note 115 (discussing several
problems with inappropriate juvenile facilities).
134

135
See Bishop, supra note 1, at 85–86 (outlining the negative consequences associated with
the widespread transfer of juveniles to adult courts). A sound alternative to criminal sanctions is a
behavioral, skills-focused program that promotes intense social interaction over a period of several
months. Id. at 86.

See Clarke, supra note 4, at 725 (“Catch phrases and sound bites, while useful for politicians,
cannot and should not inform juvenile justice policy.”). Excessive media coverage of violent crimes
does not reflect reality, as juvenile crime rates have actually fallen since 1994. See Gray, supra note
3, at 47–50 (discussing the effects of media coverage on public policy, especially the transition to a
more punitive juvenile justice system).
136

137
See Gray, supra note 3, at 45 (describing how inaccurate media coverage of juvenile crimes
ultimately influences public policy). Disturbingly, juvenile crime news is much more common than
media coverage of general issues surrounding children. Id.

See Feld, supra note 59, at 190 (describing how politicians have advocated a tough stance
towards youth crime in order to gain an electoral advantage); McLatchey, supra note 3, at 406
(noting how politicians rely on “get tough on crime” policies to win elections).
138
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“get tough on crime” movement is fundamentally unsound, as lawmakers overemphasize the accountability of juveniles in response to political pressure.139 At
oral argument, the respondent in Graham admitted that a five-year-old child
could receive a life-without-parole sentence under Florida law.140 Such laws
clearly involve a defect in the democratic process and should be subject to close
judicial scrutiny.141
The Graham Court should have acted independently and judiciously to
correct such a bizarre and problematic sentencing practice.142 Instead, the majority
turned to a “lockstep” survey of actual sentencing practices across states.143 The
Graham Court found that only eleven states actually impose JLWOP sentences
upon non-homicide offenders, thereby avoiding any counter-majoritarian
difficulty.144 The Court should go beyond this kind of firm majoritarian analysis,

See Clarke, supra note 4, at 725 (noting how politicians have over-emphasized the
accountability of juveniles in response to political pressures). A comprehensive review of empirical
research indicates that transfer laws have no deterrent value, general or specific. See Bishop, supra
note 1, at 128–34 (describing the actual effects of transfer laws).
139

140
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025–26 (2010) (noting how at oral arguments
the State of Florida acknowledged a five-year-old child could theoretically receive a life-withoutparole sentence under Florida’s transfer provisions). Similarly to Terrance Graham, an astounding
sixty-four percent of juvenile offenders are incarcerated for simple probation violations. See Your
Neighbor’s Child, supra note 115 (describing incarceration rates for juvenile offenders).
141
See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (“Federal courts have an independent
interest in ensuring . . . that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”); Clarke, supra
note 4, at 686 (observing that children in elementary school can be charged as adults); Erik G.
Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 Duke L.J. 787, 808 (1999) (“[T]he Court should only intervene
when the political process has malfunctioned.”). According to representation reinforcement theory,
the Court should correct laws which are the product of a defect in the democratic process. Id.
142
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (describing how the Court determines an
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment through its own independent judgment); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the Court exists to correct
fundamentally unfair aspects of the criminal process); Clarke, supra note 4, at 688 (describing
how the increasingly punitive approach to juvenile justice is fueled by public hysteria rather than
scientific principles); Luna, supra note 141, at 808 (stating that malfunctioning legislation should
be subject to strict scrutiny); Nilsen, supra note 22, at 116 (describing how prison terms do not get
adequate judicial scrutiny under current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–24 (tallying actual sentencing practices across the country
to determine that a national consensus had formed against JLWOP sentences); Lain, supra note
113, at 372–73 (describing the “evolving standards of decency” analysis as firmly majoritarian).
But see Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the Mentally Retarded, 53 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 171, 185 (2002) (describing the evolving standards analysis as “‘flexible and dynamic’”
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976))). The Supreme Court has previously relied
on “lockstep” state-counting analyses, affirming the view that the Court is essentially a majoritarian
institution. Lain, supra note 113, at 372–75.
143

144
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (finding that only eleven jurisdictions nationwide
impose JLWOP sentences); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 201–02 (2002) (describing the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty”—a theory that the power of judicial review contravenes the will
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and take on a more heroic, independent role.145 This has been seen before, when
the Roe v. Wade Court struck down laws in many states, recognizing its duty to
resolve issues independently and unemotionally.146
Legislative judgments as to the length of a sentence receive some degree of
judicial deference, but the Court has the final say.147 If the Court has reason to
disagree with the judgment of legislatures, it may do so through its interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment.148 Although Graham had its shortcomings, the Court
did interpret the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting all barbaric punishments—
consistent with concerns of the Drafters.149 Graham also stated that even criminals
have a right to their dignity, which denotes the return to a humane interpretation
of the people, expressed through their elected representatives). Alexander Bickel, who coined this
phrase, asserted that the power of judicial review is inherently undemocratic. Friedman, supra,
at 202.
145
See Lain, supra note 113, at 419 (commenting that the Supreme Court is famous for its
“heroic, countermajoritarian role”); Luna & Cassell, supra note 38, at 28–29 (criticizing current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as providing inadequate checks on excessive punishment). As
long as the Court remains firmly majoritarian, landmark rulings are exceedingly unlikely. See Lain,
supra note 113, at 409 (“So long as the Supreme Court is counting states to determine the contours
of constitutional protection, there is no chance of bold rulings that leave the states behind.”).
146
See 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.”). The Roe Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute criminalizing abortion and acknowledged that a majority of states had similar statutes. Id.
at 118, 166. The Roe v. Wade decision affected laws in forty-six states total. William Mears &
Bob Franken, 30 Years After Ruling, Ambiguity, Anxiety Surround Abortion Debate, Cnn.com/Law
Center (Sep. 17, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/21/roevwade.overview/.
Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education the Court struck down segregation laws in effect in many
states at the time of the decision. See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (noting the wide applicability of
the Court’s ruling against the “separate but equal” doctrine); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law Principles and Policies 707–08 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the intense political backlash against
Brown by a group of ninety-six Southern Congressmen).

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–99 (1991) (noting how determinations
about prison terms involve penological judgments that are generally left to legislatures); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (noting the Court’s reluctance to review legislatively mandated
sentences); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (describing the Supreme Court as the
“final authority” of constitutional interpretation).
147

148
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–13 (2002) (explaining the significance of
any legislative consensus in an “evolving standards of decency” analysis). Objective evidence of
sentencing practices, such as legislative trends, do not “wholly determine” the constitutionality
of a particular sentence. Id. at 312. If there is reason to disagree with sentencing legislation, the
Court may do so as a function of its own independent judgment. See id. at 313 (describing how
the Constitution empowers the Court to determine the acceptability of punishments under the
Eighth Amendment).

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (observing that barbaric punishments are unconstitutional
under all circumstances); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (noting that the very purpose
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is to proscribe torture and other “barbarous” methods
of punishment). Even from an originalist perspective, the Eighth Amendment was intended to
prohibit certain methods of punishment. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 (describing the Framers’
intent to prohibit certain types of punishment).
149
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of the Eighth Amendment.150 After two decades of narrow proportionality review,
the Court has returned to its initial concerns with humane sentencing practices,
and for good reason.151 The Court should place some outer limits on sentencing
practices such as JLWOP sentences, consistent with the vision of dignity embodied
in the Eighth Amendment.152

International Law as a Model for American Juvenile Justice
The Graham Court had an ideal opportunity to bring our juvenile justice
system up to international standards by prohibiting all JLWOP sentences, but it
failed to do so.153 Our juvenile justice system was a model for the rest of the world
at its inception, but we have recently fallen behind international standards—as
acknowledged in Graham and Roper.154 Other nations have implemented

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (“[The government] must respect the human attributes even
of those who have committed serious crimes.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (stating
that the Eighth Amendment confines the State’s power to punish within civilized standards); Nilsen,
supra note 22, at 140–42 (arguing that the Court’s initial understanding of the Eighth Amendment
encompassed broad standards of humanity and dignity).
150

151
See Nilsen, supra note 22, at 113 (noting that prior to Harmelin’s narrow proportionality
review in 1991, life without parole sentences were unusual for non-homicide offenses); Smith &
Cohen, supra note 5, at 88 (“Non-capital defendants have struggled greatly against the weight of
the death-is-different philosophy.”); Amy Vanheuverzwyn, The Law and Economics of Prison Health
Care: Legal Standards and Financial Burdens, 13 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 119, 123 (2009)
(noting early Supreme Court decisions that reflected a belief in humane justice). Graham’s categorical
restriction against JLWOP sentences defies some twenty-odd years of narrow proportionality
review. See 130 S. Ct. at 2047 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing how the Court “hurtles” past its
traditional proportionality analysis). In the concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts also criticized
a categorical rule as unnecessarily broad. See id. at 2041–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (advocating
for the continuance of traditional proportionality review of JLWOP sentences).

See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions; Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 521 (2010) (stating the United States justice system
enshrines the concept of dignity as “an end point that cannot be passed”). In essence, the Eighth
Amendment places outer boundaries on allowable punishment. Id. The Court’s initial understanding
of the Eighth Amendment “guarantees every citizen a right of human dignity against which all
sentences should be assessed.” Nilsen, supra note 22, at 140.
152

153
See de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 990–91 (describing how the United States
is the only country currently violating the international consensus against JLWOP sentences).
The United States is singlehandedly responsible for 100% of offenders serving JLWOP sentences.
Id. at 989.
154
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (noting that JLWOP sentences are inconsistent with
international principles of decency); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (acknowledging
the “overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”); Annino,
supra note 44, at 473–74 (describing how the United States pioneered the unique concept of a
juvenile justice system, which was an example for the international community at its inception). But
the United States recently failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which leaves us “conspicuously out of step with the international community.” Jefferson & Head,
supra note 47, at 126. In fact, the laws of numerous U.S. states are “embarrassingly inconsistent”
with international standards of juvenile justice. Id. at 96.
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progressive juvenile justice standards, and their efforts have effectively reduced
recidivism and incarceration rates.155 For its part, Graham recognized the
importance of redemption and rehabilitation in juvenile justice.156 However, the
Court did not adequately explain why JLWOP sentences provide an acceptable
punishment for some offenders but not for others.157
The Graham Court even recognized that other nations universally oppose
JLWOP sentences yet ultimately failed to follow their lead.158 The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child—ratified by every country except the
United States and Somalia—forbids JLWOP sentences and mandates the
humanitarian treatment of juvenile offenders.159 Furthermore, several United
Nations Committees have expressed their disapproval of our country’s imposition
of JLWOP sentences.160 The international community has spoken against all
JLWOP sentences, and the Graham Court should have followed accordingly.161
See de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 1019–22 (describing several rehabilitative
models of juvenile justice which effectively reduce recidivism). Germany’s model of juvenile justice
aims to educate juvenile offenders and only implements imprisonment as a last resort. Id. at 1020.
Between 1982 and 1990, incarceration of juvenile offenders in Germany decreased by fifty percent.
Id. New Zealand takes a restorative approach to juvenile justice, avoiding prosecution and focusing
on collective responsibility for the offender’s actions. Id. at 1020–22. As a result, an astonishing
eighty-three percent of offenders are diverted from its criminal courts. Id. at 1022.
155

156
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448,
1459 (declaring that courts of law shall primarily consider the best interest of the child and only
use imprisonment as a last resort against juvenile offenders); Smith & Cohen, supra note 5, at
92 (describing how Graham is the first case to explicitly integrate principles of redemption and
rehabilitation into the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). The public also has an interest
in a rehabilitative model of juvenile justice. See Your Neighbor’s Child, supra note 115 (describing
public outcry against the lack of education and job training in juvenile detention facilities).

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23 (stating the case applies to a range of offenders without
explaining why homicide offenders are excluded); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting juvenile offenders,
as a whole, “cannot be reliably classified among the worst offenders”). But see Kennedy v. Louisiana,
128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (differentiating homicide offenders from those who did not kill or
intend to kill). Graham’s concurrence also noted that juvenile offenders are generally less culpable
than their adult counterparts. See 130 S. Ct. at 2040 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that
Graham’s age placed him in a wholly different category from adult offenders serving life terms).
157

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (majority opinion) (noting a worldwide consensus against
JLWOP sentences); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 985 (“Based on the author’s [research],
there is only one country in the world today that continues to sentence child offenders to LWOP
terms: the United States.”).
158

159
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 156, at 1470 (forbidding the use of
life-without-parole sentences or inhumane punishment against children); de la Vega & Leighton,
supra note 56, at 1009–10 (describing key provisions and the ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child).

See de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 1010–12 (describing international disapproval
of JLWOP sentences). For instance, the Committee on Human Rights oversees compliance with
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id. at 1010. That Committee
determined JLWOP sentences violate the United States’ obligations under the ICCPR. Id.
160

161
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 31
I.L.M. 645, 651 (1992) (“[J]uvenile offenders [shall] be segregated from adults and be accorded
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Although a controversial subject, customary international law can even be
binding in some instances.162 Nearly universal norms of international law—
known as jus cogens norms—are binding upon nations regardless of consent.163
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the prohibition of torture
is binding as customary international law.164 Another circuit noted customary
international law denounces enslavement and genocide, and this prohibition
is binding on civilized nations.165 Similarly, the widespread consensus against
JLWOP sentences has become nearly universal and therefore risen to the level of
a jus cogens norm.166
Although the Graham Court dismissed the possibility of a binding jus cogens
norm, it should have given more weight to the persuasive international norm

treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.”); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 1012
(noting that the United Nations General Assembly recently passed two resolutions against JLWOP
sentences, opposed only by the United States).
162
See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 (Feb. 5)
(stating that nations should be held responsible for violations of universal human rights); Jing Guan,
The ICC’s Jurisdiction over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for
China’s Accession?, 28 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 703, 715 n.96 (2010) (describing how the implications
of customary international law have remained a controversial subject). Barcelona Traction has been
construed to suggest that basic human rights give rise to obligations erga omnes. Theoder Meron, On
a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 1 (1986). Obligations erga omnes
are rights owed to all, including the prohibitions against racial discrimination and genocide. See
Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 33, 34 (describing certain rights as the concern of all states).
163
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (describing jus cogens norms as peremptory, therefore permitting no derogation); 48 C.J.S.
International Law § 2 (“Jus cogens norms are norms of international law that are binding on states,
or nations, even if they do not agree to them.”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 102 cmt. k (2010) (describing the binding effect of jus cogens norms). But
see Suydam v. Williamson, 65 U.S. 427, 433 (1860) (“Every sovereign has the exclusive right to
command within his territory.”).

See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1017 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (commenting
on the binding weight of international norms prohibiting torture). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has also recognized jus cogens norms against torture, murder, genocide, and slavery. See
United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th. Cir. 1995) (explaining why the
prohibition against kidnapping cannot rise to the level of other jus cogens norms).
164

165
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing
the principle of jus cogens norms in the context of WWII concentration camps).
166
Brief for Amnesty International, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–15,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Amnesty Brief ]
(noting a worldwide jus cogens norm against JLWOP sentences followed by every country except
the United States); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 1015–16 (describing the prohibition
against JLWOP sentences as a virtually universal jus cogens norm); see also Hansen, supra note 5,
at 54 (noting the Graham Court’s recognition of a global consensus against JLWOP sentences).
America’s recent and substantial expansion of adult prisoners serving life terms is also unheard of at
an international level. Nilsen, supra note 22, at 119.
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against JLWOP sentences.167 Federal courts have consistently affirmed that
domestic law can recognize the law of nations.168 Courts should remain mindful
of international human rights norms, because international law provides no
means for redress of jus cogens violations.169 In fact, the Roper Court recognized
international norms as an instructive tool in its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.170 Although some courts and commentators would disagree, jus
cogens norms should play a larger role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
the evolving standards of decency analysis.171
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (noting international norms are not binding or controlling);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (stating that it “does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution” to acknowledge global affirmations of fundamental rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 576–78 (2003) (overruling a prior decision due to its irrationality and inconsistencies
with international norms); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104
Yale L.J. 39, 40 (1994) (concluding that the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence demonstrate a lack
of respect for international norms); Amnesty Brief, supra note 166, at 10 (arguing that international
standards should weigh heavily in the Court’s consideration of cruel and unusual punishment).
However, some would argue that international standards are irrelevant to any interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989) (rejecting
the sentencing practices of other countries as unimportant to the evolving standards of decency
analysis), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
167

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centuries we have affirmed
that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”); Igartua-De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 171–72 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing that our legal system encompasses
international law). Federal courts also have the right to hear cases involving international treaties,
although the disposition of jus cogens violations is a murkier subject. See U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2 (declaring that judicial power extends to all cases arising under treaties); M. Cherif. Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 64–67
(1996) (describing significant uncertainty about the enforcement of jus cogens norms).
168

169
See The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1862) (describing the law of nations as
founded upon the common consent of the world); Meron, supra note 162, at 3 (1986) (noting
the international community has no supreme legislature which sits above its constituent nations).
The application and enforcement of jus cogens norms is especially difficult because of widespread
disagreement about the nature of human rights. See Meron, supra note 162, at 4 (noting widespread
controversy about international human rights). In fact, many of the principal human rights
instruments—including the Political Covenant, the American Convention, and the European
Convention—contain different lists of non-derogable rights. Id. at 15.
170
543 U.S. at 575. The Roper Court implicitly acknowledged a jus cogens norm against the
execution of juveniles, without regard to whether it was binding or controlling. See id. at 578
(“It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional
imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”).

Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting international norms as uninformative to constitutional interpretation), and Belhas v.
Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing how even jus cogens violations like those
committed by the Third Reich would not create an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act), with Bassiouni, supra note 168, at 65 (describing jus cogens as universal duties rather than
optional rights), and Blackmun, supra note 167, at 49 (“[P]erhaps [it] is appropriate to remind
ourselves that the United States is part of the global community, that ‘[i]nternational law is part
of our law,’ and that courts should construe our statutes, our treaties, and our Constitution, where
possible, consistently with ‘the customs and usages of civilized nations.’” (quoting The Paquete
171
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida overturned a flawed
sentencing practice—sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without
parole—but failed to go far enough.172 An undeniable and unjustified risk of
sentencing error exists with regards to JLWOP sentences.173 Congress has not
set mandatory regulations for the treatment of juvenile offenders, and thus the
Court is in the unique position to correct punitive juvenile justice standards.174
The international community universally condemns JLWOP sentences, and the
United States should follow suit.175 Based on the above concerns, the Graham
Court should have taken appropriate steps to safeguard our nation’s children and
prohibited JLWOP sentences under any circumstances.176

Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))). The opening passage of the Declaration of Independence even
acknowledges “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.” The Declaration of Independence
para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
See supra notes 100–71 and accompanying text (describing several problems with
JLWOP sentences).
172

See supra notes 104–26 and accompanying text (noting the inherent risk of sentencing
error with JLWOP sentences).
173

See supra notes 127–52 and accompanying text (advocating for increased judicial activism
with regards to unsound sentencing practices).
174

175
See supra notes 153–71 and accompanying text (describing the weight given to international
norms). See generally de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 56, at 988 (concluding that the United
States should abolish JLWOP sentences).
176

See supra notes 100–71 and accompanying text (taking issue with JLWOP sentences).
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